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PRE-ACQUISITION CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ACQUIRERS
Rupendra Paliwal, Sacred Heart University, Fairfield, CT, USA
ABSTRACT
Existing empirical literature has extensively analyzed post-acquisition performance of the acquirers to
evaluate success of the takeover. The academic literature tends to agree that target shareholders benefit
from takeovers; however takeovers benefits for acquiring firm’s shareholders have been questioned. A
majority of empirical literature indicate acquisition announcements are associated with a decrease in
acquiring shareholder’s wealth. While pre-acquisition characteristics of takeover targets have been
extensively analyzed, empirical literature has not directly and comprehensively analyzed pre-acquisition
financial and operating characteristics of the acquiring firms. In this paper, I examine pre-acquisition
operating performance and governance characteristics of acquirers. Results suggest that bidders are
large firms compared to their industry peers. I also find that bidders are characterized by low insider
ownership, high institutional holding and high leverage, indicating higher outside monitoring of the
managers. Bidders in general report superior operating performance as indicated by higher return on
equity and lower operating expenses. Consistent with existing research, I found that the takeover
announcement period abnormal returns are negative for bidders irrespective of their operating
performance and governance characteristics.
Keywords: Mergers, Acquisition, Acquirers, Takeovers,
1. INTRODUCTION
Existing literature has suggested a number of motives for acquisitions. Three main motives that have
been identified are synergy, agency and hubris. The synergy motive is based on the belief that combined
firm will be more valuable as a result of increased efficiencies. The agency motive suggests that takeover
is driven by the private benefits of control for the acquiring management. The hubris hypothesis
suggested by Roll (1986) states that managers tend to overestimate their own capabilities and overpay
for the target firms. While synergy benefits are likely to be shared by shareholders of both acquirers and
targets, in agency or hubris driven acquisitions, acquiring shareholders are likely to experience wealth
destruction. A growing body of empirical literature indicates acquisition announcements are associated
with a decrease in acquiring shareholder’s wealth. This suggests that a majority of acquisitions are
probably driven by managerial hubris or agency conflicts.
Existing empirical literature has primarily focused on post-acquisition performance of the acquirers to
evaluate success of the takeover and determine what motivates takeover. While pre-acquisition
characteristics of takeover targets have been extensively analyzed, empirical literature has not directly
and comprehensively analyzed pre-acquisition financial and operating characteristics of the acquiring
firms. In this paper, I examine pre-acquisition operating performance and governance characteristics of
acquirers. The main objective of this paper is to compare and contrast pre-acquisition operating, financial
and governance characteristics of the acquirers with those of their peers. In this paper I also address the
issue of agency driven self-serving attempts by the acquirer management, by looking at their preacquisition operating performance in the presence of alternative control mechanisms and potentially high
agency problems. Finally, I also analyze impact of operating performance and governance characteristics
on announcement period abnormal stock returns for bidders.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
The free cash flow theory of Jensen (1986) argues that managers have incentives to expand firms
beyond their optimal size because that increases resources under managers control and also because
managerial compensation is often tied to firm size. Therefore, managers endowed with excess free cash
flow will often invest in negative NPV projects. Different internal/external control mechanisms exist to
prevent such non-value maximizing behavior of the managers. These mechanisms could be equity-based
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compensation for managers, high insider holdings, external monitoring by blockholders and debtholders
and presence of external board members.
Williamson (1963) argues that managers do not have neutral attitude towards costs. Managers have
expense preference, i.e., certain class of expenditures has a positive value associated with them.
Specifically, staff expenses, expenditure for emoluments and funds available for discretionary
investments have value additional to that which derives from their productivity. He implies that managers
may choose to shirk and indulge in excessive consumption of perquisites. He also observes that, as with
the expansion of staff, the expansion of physical plant and equipment is also subject to managerial
discretion.
Existing research has looked at post-acquisition performance to evaluate benefits of takeovers. Healy,
Palepu and Ruback (1992) do not find any post-acquisition change in capital expenditures and R&D
expenses in a sample of 50 acquisitions. However, they observe a significant improvement in industryadjusted asset productivity for the combined firm, which leads to higher operating cash flow returns.
Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) found that while acquisitions by large firms are associated with
losses in shareholder wealth, acquisitions by small firms have significant positive abnormal returns.
Hubbard and Palia (1995) observe that managers of acquiring firms overpay when their ownership stake
is low (attributable to unobservable perquisite consumption) and when their ownership stake is high
(reflecting their private benefits of control). This finding is consistent with Jensen (1976), Morck, Schleifer
and Vishny (1988) and Stulz (1988). Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman (2001) document a strong positive
relation between acquiring managers’ equity-based compensation (EBC) and stock price performance
around and following acquisition announcements. These results suggest that if managers’ and
shareholders’ interests are not properly aligned, managers might undertake unprofitable takeovers. If
these takeovers are manifestations of self-serving attempts by the acquirers, then I expect that such
bidders will also have high agency costs which might result in poor operating performance. This motivates
my first hypothesis: bidders with high levels of cash, few investments opportunities coupled with low or
very high insider holdings IH, low external monitoring by debtholders will have higher operating expenses.
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) find that the returns to bidding shareholders are lower when the
bidding firm diversifies, when it buys a rapidly growing target and when its managers performed poorly
before the acquisition. Mitchell and Lehn (1990) find that firms that subsequently become takeover targets
made acquisitions that significantly reduced their equity value, and firms that do not become takeover
targets made acquisitions that raised their equity value. Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991) document that
for successful tender offers bidder returns are significantly negatively related to cash flow for low q
bidders but not for high q bidders. Harford (1999) concludes that cash-rich firms are more likely than other
firms to attempt acquisitions. He also documents that cash-rich firms with greater likelihood of agency
problems as evidenced by low managerial ownership are more likely to account for acquisition activity.
Looking at stock returns, he finds that acquisitions by cash-rich firms are value decreasing. He also
observes that mergers in which the bidder is cash-rich are followed by abnormal declines in operating
performance of the merged firms. These results are true for both high q and low q firms. This suggests
that takeovers in which the bidders have greater likelihood of agency problems will be value-decreasing
for the bidding shareholders.
Therefore, my second hypothesis is: for takeovers where the bidders have higher pre-acquisition capital
expenditures, cash levels, low investment opportunities, very low or very high insider holdings IH, low
external monitoring by debtholders, and poor operating performance (high operating expenses), the
announcement period abnormal returns to bidding shareholders will be lower (more negative).
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
I identify all mergers and tender offers during the period 1993-2002 using the SDC on-line Mergers and
Corporate Transactions database. SDC provides data on announcement date, completion date, total deal
value, form of payment, and whether or not the deal was classified as hostile/tender offer. Firms in
regulated industries (Financial, Transportation & Communication, and Public Administration) are
eliminated to avoid contamination of results from regulatory changes in these industries. In order to be
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included in the sample, both the target and the acquirer were required to be listed on the NYSE,
NASDAQ or AMEX, and each bidder’s return data had to be available on the Center for Research in
Security Prices (“CRSP”) tapes. Additionally, total asset and net sales data had to be available in
Standard & Poor’s Compustat files. Other financial data was also obtained from Compustat. The
percentage of insider ownership (“IH”) and institutional holdings were collected from the Compact
Disclosure (“CD”) database for the year before each of the announcement dates.
SDC lists 3,425 completed mergers or tender offers that were announced between January 1, 1993 and
December 31, 2002. Of these deals, 1,745 involved firms in regulated industries. Of the remaining deals,
203 did not have either the bidder’s or the target’s return data available on CRSP tapes. Finally, 306
deals lacked total asset or net sales data in Compustat for either the bidder or the target. Of the
remaining 1,171 deals (876 mergers and 295 tender offers); data on insider ownership and institutional
holdings was available for 972 bidders. My analysis is focused on this final group. SDC classified 295 of
these 972 deals as tender offers and 27 of them as hostile takeovers. Further, 392 of the deals were
cash-only transactions and 202 were hybrid transactions (a combination of cash and stock). The
remaining deals were classified as shares only or other types of transactions. Following is the breakdown
of the final sample listed by year of takeover announcement:
Year
Final Sample

1993
32

1994
49

1995
79

1996
92

1997
113

1998
139

1999
141

2000
139

2001
119

2002
69

Total
972

Following Song and Walking (1993), for each bidder in the sample I choose two control firms: one from
the same two-digit SIC code representing industry peers, (hereafter referred to as “ASCF”), and one
randomly chosen from the set of all control firms listed during the year in which the acquisition was
announced (hereafter referred to as “ARCF”). For bidders, I used the SIC codes reported in the SDC
database at the time of their acquisition announcement, and, for control firms, I used the SIC codes
reported in the CD database in the year of their acquisition announcement. To construct the control
sample, for each year in the sample (1993 through 2002), I started with a list of firms for which insider
holding and institutional holding data were available in the CD database. From this list, I removed firms
for which financial data was not available in Compustat for the previous two years. After removing target
firms and bidders from this list, I matched the remaining control firms to the bidder firms based on their
two-digit SIC codes, selecting a ASCF for each bidder. From the remainder, I then randomly selected one
ARCF for each bidder. I followed this procedure for all sample years.
4. BIDDER CHARACTERISTICS
In Table 1, I report summary statistics for all the firm categories in the sample (the bidders, the ASCFs
and the ARCFs). My objective is to compare and contrast pre-acquisition operating, financial and
governance characteristics of the bidders with those of their peers. I measure operating performance in
terms of operating expenses (OE) which is defined as cost of goods sold plus selling general and
administrative expense. This measure captures both cost inefficiency and excessive perquisite
consumption by managers. I use operating expenses both as percentage of total assets (hereafter OEA)
and as percentage of net sales (hereafter OES) for the analysis. I also report industry adjusted OEA
(hereafter IAOEA) and industry adjusted OES (hereafter IAOES). Industry adjustment is done by
subtracting industry median values of OEA and OES for each industry in each year from the respective
measures for individual firms. I also analyze, size (log of equity capitalization three months before the first
bid (price * shares outstanding from CRSP)), age (firm age at the time of acquisition was computed from
each firm’s first CRSP listing date to the date of acquisition announcement and it is rounded to number of
years), CEA (Cash and equivalents/ Total Assets), CAPEXA (Capital expenditure / Total Assets),
Leverage (LEV)(Total Debt/Total Assets) and asset turnover ratio STA (Sales/Total Asset) for acquiring
firms, their industry matched and randomly selected control firms. I also report industry-adjusted leverage
(IALEV) and Tobin’s q which is approximated by the market value of equity, plus the book value of debt,
divided by the book value of assets.
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I report median values for each of the above mentioned measures for the year prior to the year of
takeover announcement. I use Wilcoxon sign rank test for measuring statistical significance of difference
in median values for acquirers and the control firms.
TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR BIDDER AND CONTROL FIRMS
The sample consists of 972 bidders during the period January 1, 1993, to December 31, 2002. All accounting data is
collected from COMPUSTAT is from the year prior to the year of takeover announcement. Median values for each
measure is reported. The p-values from Wilcoxon signed-rank test are reported in parentheses.

Bidder
Panel A
Market Capitalization (millions of dollars)
Net Sales (millions of dollars)
Total Assets (millions of dollars)
Firm Age (years)
Panel B
Cash and Cash Equivalents/Total Assets
CEA
Capital Expenditures/ Total Assets
CAPEXA
Return on Assets (%)
ROA
Return on Equity (%)
ROE
Tobin's Q
Operating Expenses/ Net Sales
OES
Operating Expenses/ Total Assets
OEA
Sales/Total Assets
STA
Industry Adjusted OES
IAOES
Industry Adjusted OEA
IAOEA
Panel C
Insider Holding
Institutional Holding
Leverage
Industry adjusted Leverage

IH
INST
LEV
IALEV

ASCF

ARCF

1600
756
914
12.70

572(0.01)
454(0.01)
387(0.01)
11.51(0.15)

524(0.01)
545(0.01)
439(0.01)
14.23(0.01)

0.09
0.049
5.87
13.45
1.79
0.847
0.797
0.97
-0.015
-0.078

0.09(0.43)
0.053(0.16)
5.74(0.99)
11.51(0.02)
1.6(0.01)
0.865(0.01)
0.902(0.01)
1.07(0.01)
-0.002(0.01)
-0.001(0.01)

0.06(0.01)
0.057(0.01)
5.93(0.44)
12.59(0.49)
1.39(0.01)
0.878(0.01)
1.061(0.01)
1.23(0.01)
0.001(0.01)
0.001(0.01)

6
59
0.182
0.002

8.8(0.01)
54(0.01)
0.134(0.01)
-0.007(0.01)

8.8(0.01)
55(0.01)
0.194(0.16)
-0.001(0.09)

In the results reported, I find that bidders tend to be large firms compared to the control firms. In Panel A
of Table 1, the median market capitalization for acquiring firms is $1600 million compared to $572 million
for the SIC- based control firms (ASCF) and $524 million for the randomly selected control firms (ARCF).
Acquiring firms are also relatively large in terms of net sales and total assets. The median net sales and
total assets for bidders are $756 million and $914 million respectively. In comparison the median net
sales for ASCF (ARCF) firms was significantly lower at $454 million ($545 million) and total assets were
$387 million ($439 million). The firms in sample are mature companies with an average age of about 13
years.
In Panel B of Table 1, to assess operating performance of bidders some key financial ratios are reported.
The bidders have same proportion of cash and cash equivalent to total assets as firms in their industry
but it is higher compared to randomly selected control firms which do not engage in acquisition. Cash and
cash equivalents as a percentage of total assets is 9% for bidders and ASCF compared to 6% for ARCF
firms. While return on assets (ROA) is about 6% for all the firms in sample, return on equity (ROE) for the
bidders is significantly higher at 13.45% compared to ROE of 11.5% for the SIC- based control firms from
same industry. Next, I report Tobin’s q, which has been used in literature as a market based measure of
managerial performance and future growth prospect of the firm. I find that bidders are associated with
significantly higher q at 1.79 compared to a q of 1.6 for ASCF and 1.39 fro ARCF. These differences are
statistically significant. The results so far indicate that bidders are in general better performing firms.
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Next, I look at key measures of operating performance which are used later for in-depth analysis. I report
operating expenses both as a percentage of net sales and of total assets for all firm categories. Bidders
have lower median operating expenses as a percentage of sales of 84.7% as compared to 86.5% for the
ASCFs and 87.8% for the ARCFs. The acquiring firms also have lower median operating expenses as a
percentage of total assets of 79.7 as compared to 90% for the ASCFs and 106% for the ARCFs.
However, bidders have lower asset turnover ratio (STA) compared to control firms. To complement this
analysis, I have also reported industry-adjusted values for these operating expense measures (IAOEA
and IAOES). Again, bidders have significantly lower industry-adjusted operating expense percentages
than the control firms. These preliminary results again indicate that bidders are efficiently managed firms
with superior operating performance compared to their peers.
Next, I compare the governance characteristics of bidders with control firms. Bidders are characterized by
lower insider holdings when compared to control firms. The median insider holding for bidder is only 6%
while it is about 9% for control firms. Bidders have higher institutional holdings of 59% compared to about
54% for control firms. These differences are statistically significant. I also found that acquiring firms on
average use higher leverage (higher external monitoring by debt holders) compared to their industry
peers. The median leverage for bidders is 18.2% compared to median leverage of 13.4% for the firms in
same industry. Similarly industry adjusted leverage for the bidders is higher than that for control firms.
These results on governance characteristics suggest that bidders have higher external monitoring from
institutions and debt holders and the managers are not entrenched. The higher external monitoring
possibly results in better operating performance reported earlier.
5. BIDDER OPERATING PERFORMANCE
In this section, I examine whether the bidders with potentially higher agency costs are associated with
poor operating performance. If the interests of managers and shareholders are not properly aligned,
managers might resort to unprofitable takeovers. If these takeovers are a manifestation of self-serving
attempts by the acquirer managements, then such bidders are also likely to have high agency costs.
Therefore, I expect bidders with few investment opportunities, excess funds coupled with lower IH (or very
high IH), and external monitoring to have poor operating performance (higher OEA). I use following
regression specifications:
OEA = a0 + a1 LNSales + a2Leverage + a3Firm age + a4 Cash and equivalent/total assets (CEA)+ a5
Capital expenditure/Total Assets (CAPEXA) + a6 Low q + a7 Year dummies + a8 Industry dummies +
b1Insider Holding (IH) <5% + b2IH>25% + b3 LINST + b4 B + b5 B* IH5 + b6 B* IH25 + b7 B* LINST + error,
where B = 1 for bidders and 0 for control firms. IH = Insider holdings calculated as the total number of
shares held in aggregate by all officers and directors divided by the number of shares outstanding as
reported in the proxy statement in the year prior to the acquisition. IH5 is an indicator variable which is
equal to 1 if the percentage of insider holdings is less than 5%, and IH25 is an indicator variable which is
equal to 1 if the percentage of insider holdings is greater than 25%. LINST is an indicator variable which
is equal to 1 if the percentage of institutional holdings is at or below the median at the year-end prior to
the bid announcement.
The focus is not on OEA in general, but on that part of the OEA which stems from agency problems. I
introduced dummies B, IH5, IH25 and LINST in the first regression. In subsequent regressions, I
interacted bidder dummy B with other dummy variables representing agency variables IH5, IH25 and
LINST. Therefore, the coefficients of primary interest are b4 to b7. I hypothesize that bidder with low
(indicating misalignment of managerial preferences) or very high insider holdings (indicating entrenched
managers) and low external monitoring by debt holders would have higher operating expenses.
Therefore, I expect a positive sign on coefficients b4 to b7.
Entries in the second-to-last row of Table 2 indicate that these regressions explain 22% of the crosssectional variations in operating expenses as a percentage of total assets and 5% of the variations in
industry-adjusted operating expenses as a percentage of total assets, using adjusted R-squares. The last
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row shows the total number of bidder firms and their controls for which data was available. Insider holding
data was available for 972 bidders. For each bidder, I selected two control firms; therefore, the total
number of firms in each regression was 2916 (972 × 3).
TABLE 2: BIDDER OPERATING PERFORMANCE AND GOVERNANCE CHARACTERISTICS
In this table, I have reported results from the regression model where the dependent variables are operating
expenses scaled by total assets (OEA) and industry-adjusted operating expenses scaled by total assets (IAOEA).
Industry and year dummies are included in all the regressions (not reported separately below).Significance is based
on the White-adjusted standard errors. P-values are reported next to the coefficients in parentheses.

OEA
Intercept
LNSALES
LEVERAGE
LNAGE
CEA
CAPEXA
LOW Q
IH5
IH25
LINST
B
B*IH5
B*IH25
B*LINST
Adjusted R2
N

Model 1
1.282(0.01)
0.091(0.01)
0.002(0.01)
-0.015(0.44)
-0.443(0.01)
-0.022(0.93)
0.074(0.02)
-0.175(0.01)
0.006(0.89)
0.122(0.01)
-0.195(0.01)

0.22
2916

Model 2
1.334(0.01)
0.068(0.01)
0.002(0.01)
-0.009(0.63)
-0.465(0.01)
0.064(0.82)
0.083(0.01)

-0.31(0.01)
-0.012(0.86)
0.037(0.42)
0.22
2916

IAOEA
Model 3
0.422(0.01)
0.072(0.01)
0.002(0.22)
-0.011(0.59)
-0.411(0.01)
0.122(0.65)
0.017(0.55)
-0.162(0.01)
0.014(0.76)
0.111(0.01)
-0.176(0.01)

0.05
2916

Model 4
0.492(0.01)
0.049(0.01)
0.002(0.25)
-0.008(0.66)
-0.437(0.01)
0.201(0.45)
0.026(0.46)

-0.263(0.01)
-0.039(0.58)
0.038(0.44)
0.05
2916

The coefficient estimates for the log of sales is positive and significant. The coefficients indicate that the
higher the sales, the higher is operating expense which is expected. I notice that firms with higher
leverage have higher operating expenses, although the coefficient is not significant. I also note that in
general firms with higher cash levels as indicated by CEA tend to have lower operating expenses. This
might indicate firms with better operating performance that are generating positive cash flows. The results
suggest that in general firms with insider holdings of less than 5% have significantly lower operating
expenses. Results also indicate that operating expenses are higher for firms with lower institutional
holdings (and, consequently, low levels of external monitoring).
In Model 1, I tested whether bidders have higher operating expenses relative to control firms. Consistent
with univariate analysis, I found that bidders, in general, are characterized by lower operating expenses.
The coefficient of -0.195 on the dummy variable B in this regression (significant at the 1% level) implies
that the OEA is significantly lower for the bidders than that for the control sample. In Model 2, I tested
whether the bidders with very low or high insider ownership and low institutional holdings have higher
operating expenses. The results indicate that contrary to our hypothesis bidders with lower levels of
insider holdings (indicating agency conflict) have lower operating expenses. In Models 3 and 4, I did a
similar analysis using industry-adjusted operating expenses as a dependent variable. The results are
similar, again indicating bidders in general and, especially, bidders with low insider holdings have lower
operating expenses. Overall, the results from Table II suggest that bidders in general irrespective of their
governance characteristics have superior operating performance compared to control firms.
6. BIDDERS ABNORMAL RETURNS
If a takeover bid is seen as driven by hubris or agency conflict, shareholders of such bidding firms should
experience negative announcement period abnormal returns. In this section, I investigate if bidders with
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higher operating expenses and low or very high insider holdings (IH5 and IH25), low external monitoring
by institutional shareholders and debt holders experience more negative announcement period abnormal
returns. I present descriptive statistics for the announcement period cumulative abnormal returns
(hereafter CAR) in Table 3, for the entire bidder sample and for several sub-samples.
TABLE 3: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS AND BIDDER ABNORMAL RETURNS
The market model parameters were estimated for bidders over a 250-day period, ending 30 trading days before their
initial takeover announcements. The value-weighted CRSP index was used as a proxy for the market. Abnormal
returns (CAR(-5,1)) were accumulated from five days before each initial announcement until the day after each initial
announcement. To test the null hypothesis that the mean announcement period CARs were equal to zero for the
entire sample and all sub-samples, I used the standardized abnormal return test, called Z statistic, consistent with
Patell (1976). In addition, to allow for a possible increase in volatility within the event window, I have reported the
standardized cross-sectional test introduced by Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991), denoted as SCS Z. Finally,
to complement the above two parametric tests, I have also reported the generalized sign Z (“GEN SIGN Z”), which
tests the hypothesis that the fraction of positive returns is the same during the event window and the estimation
period. The $,*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively, using a 1tail test.

N
950

MCAR
-1.53%

Pos/Neg
391:559

Z
-5.889***

SCS Z
-4.79***

GEN SIGN Z
-3.209***

IH5
IH25
Other

444
182
324

-1.57%
-0.48%
-2.07%

192:252
82:100
118:206

-4.875***
0.056
-4.372***

-4.120***
0.043
-3.579***

-1.891*
-0.26
-3.076**

Low IAOEA
High IAOEA

475
475

-2.11%
-0.93%

185:290
215:262

-5.382***
-2.76**

-4.253***
-2.323*

-3.677***
-0.872

Low IAOES
High IAOES

475
475

-1.73%
-1.31%

186:289
212:263

-5.117***
-3.021**

-4.086***
-2.514**

-3.612***
-0.93

Low IALEV
High IALEV

471
479

-1.67%
-1.37%

196:275
202:277

-4.538***
-3.602***

-3.924***
-2.779**

-2.355**
-2.188*

All Bidders

The first column in Table 3 describes sub-sample characteristics, the second column gives the number of
firms in each sub-sample and the third column reports mean cumulative abnormal returns CAR(-5, 1).
The fourth column indicates number of firms having positive and negative CAR respectively during the
period and in the last three columns I report statistics from the test of null hypothesis that the mean
announcement period CARs are equal to zero. Out of 972 bidders, 22 firms do not have sufficient data
during the estimation period for computing CARs. Consistent with previous research, announcement
period abnormal returns are negative and significant for the entire sample and all sub-samples. The mean
cumulative abnormal return for the entire sample is -1.53%, which is highly significant at the 1% level.
First, I construct three sub-samples based on the level of insider holdings (IH) in the bidder firms.
Consistent with my expectations, bidders with IH less than 5% experience more negative mean
announcement period abnormal returns of -1.57% compared to -0.48% for firms with insider holdings
between 5% and 25%. My primary focus is on operating performance. Therefore, I construct sub-samples
based on industry adjusted operating expenses scaled by total assets (IAOEA) and industry adjusted
operating expenses by net sales (IAOES). Firms are assigned to sub-samples depending on whether
IAOEA/IAOES is above or below the median IAOEA/IAOES. Bidder firms with lower IAOEA experience
more negative abnormal returns of -2.11% compared to -0.93% for bidders with higher IAOEA. The
results are similar for sub-samples based on IAOES. Bidders with lower IAOES experience more negative
abnormal returns of -1.73% compared to returns of -1.31% for bidders with higher IAOES. This suggest
market perceive takeovers by better performing firms (lower operating expenses) as waste of resources.
Finally, sub-samples based on industry adjusted leverage (IALEV) suggest that bidders with lower
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industry adjusted leverage (lower outside monitoring) experience more negative announcement period
abnormal returns as compared to bidders with higher industry adjusted leverage. Altogether, the results
presented in Table III suggest that investors are skeptical about takeover attempts by the managers of
acquiring firms, particularly by firms with lower external monitoring and good operating performance.
To control for effects of deal characteristics on announcement period abnormal returns and based on
existing empirical research, I use following regression specifications to investigate if the bidder firms with
higher OEA coupled with lower or higher insider holdings IH and low monitoring by debt holders
experience more negative announcement period abnormal returns. The results are reported in Table 4.
CAR = a0 + a1 HOSTILE + a2 MULTIB + a3 TENDER + a4 ALLCASH + a5 LNRELSIZE + a6 Leverage + a7
LOWTQ + a8 HIGHAQ + a9 Year dummies + a10 Industry dummies + b1 OEA + b2 CEA + b3 CAPEXA + b4
IH5 + b5 IH25 + b6 LINST + error
TABLE 4: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF BIDDER ABNORMAL RETURNS
A regression model was used to explain the cumulative abnormal returns for bidders over the trading days (-5, 1)
surrounding the date of the takeover announcements. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) were measured using the
market model. HOSTILE, MULTIB and TENDER are dummy variables equal to 1 for takeovers identified as hostile,
having multiple bidders or tender offers, respectively, by SDC. ALLCASH is a dummy variable equal to 1 for
transactions where cash is the only consideration paid and is equal to zero otherwise. LNRELSIZE is natural
logarithm of relative size. Relative size is the ratio of target-to-acquirer market capitalization (measured three months
before the acquisition announcement). LOWTQ is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Tobin’s q for the target firms was
less than 1. HIGHAQ is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Tobin’s q for the acquiring firms was more than 1. CEA is the
cash and cash equivalents to total assets ratio. CAPEXA is the capital expenditures to total assets ratio. Industry and
year dummies are included in all the regressions (not reported separately below). Significance is based on Whiteadjusted standard errors. P-values are reported next to the coefficients in parentheses.

Intercept
HOSTILE
MULTIB
TENDER
ALLCASH
LNRELSIZE
Leverage
LOWTQ
HIGHAQ
OEA
CEA
CAPEXA
IH5
IH25
LINST
Adjusted R2
N

CAR
Model 1
-0.055(0.09)
-0.003(0.87)
-0.016(0.16)
0.016(0.11)
0.018(0.03)
-0.002(0.44)
0.025(0.25)
0.008(0.26)
-0.017(0.09)
0.001(0.97)

0.04
874

Model 2
-0.065(0.05)
-0.003(0.91)
0.015(0.38)
0.016(0.14)
0.018(0.08)
-0.002(0.46)
-0.026(0.19)
0.008(0.35)
-0.016(0.12)
-0006(0.78)
-0.009(0.89)
0.012(0.17)
0.015(0.18)
0.009(0.27)
0.04
874

The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR (-5, 1)). I expect that bidder with higher
IAOEA and IAOES, low or high insider holdings (IH), and low external monitoring by debt holders and
institutional shareholders would experience higher announcement period abnormal returns. Table IV
presents the results of the regression analysis. Entries in the second-to-last row indicate that these
regressions explain 4% of the cross-sectional variations in cumulative abnormal returns using adjusted Rsquares. The last row shows the number of bidder firms for which data was available. None of the test
variables are significant. As evident from the negative and statistically significant value of the intercept,
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most of the acquiring firms experience negative announcement period abnormal returns, irrespective of
deal specific characteristics or governance characteristics of the bidding firm.
7. CONCLUSION
Using a sample of mergers and tender offers made by U.S. firms during the period from 1993 to 2002, I
examined the pre-acquisition operating performance and governance characteristics of the bidders. In the
sample, I found that bidders in general are large firms compared to their industry peers. I also find that
bidders have low insider ownership. Bidders are characterized by high institutional holding and high
leverage, indicating higher outside monitoring of the managers. Bidders report superior operating
performance as indicated by higher return on equity and lower operating expenses. Consistent with
existing research, I found that the takeover announcement period abnormal returns are negative for
bidders irrespective of their operating performance and governance characteristics.
REFERENCES:
Datta, Sudip, Iskandar-Datta, M., and Raman, Kartik. Executive compensation and corporate
acquisition decisions. Journal of Finance 56, (2001), 2299-2336.
Harford, Jarrad, 1999, Corporate cash reserves and acquisitions. Journal of Finance 54, 1969-1997.
Healy, P. M., Palepu, K. G., Ruback, R. S., 1992. Does corporate performance improve after mergers?
Journal of Financial Economics 31, 135-176.
Hubbard, Glenn R., and Darius Palia, 1995. "Benefits of Control, Managerial Ownership, and the Stock
Returns of Acquiring Firms," RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 26(4), 782-793.
Jensen, Michael C., 1976, Agency costs and free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers. American
Economic Review 76, 659-665.
Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling, 1976, Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs
and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360.
Lang, L. H.P., R. M. Stulz and R. A. Walkling, 1991, A test of free cash flow hypothesis: The case of
bidder returns. Journal of Financial Economics 29, 315-335.
Mitchell, M. L., and K. Lehn, 1990, Do bad bidders make good targets? Journal of Political Economy 98,
372-398.
Moeller, Sara B., Frederik P. Schlingemann, and Rene M. Stulz, 2004, Firm size and the gains from
acquisitions, Journal of Financial Economics 73, 201-228.
Morck, R., A. Shleifer and R. W. Vishny, 1989, Alternative mechanisms for corporate control. American
Economic Review 79, 842-852.
Roll, R., 1986, The hubris hypothesis of takeovers. Journal of Business 59, 197-216.
Servaes, H., 1991, Tobin's q and the gains from takeovers. Journal of Finance 46, 409-419.
Williamson, Oliver E., 1963, Managerial discretion and business behavior. The American Economic
Review 53, 1032-1057.
AUTHOR PROFILE:
Dr. Rupendra Paliwal earned his Ph.D. at University of Connecticut, in 2005. Currently he is assistant
professor of finance at John F. Welch College of Business at Sacred Heart University, Fairfield.

Review of Business Research, Volume 8, Number 2, 2008

177

